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HOW TO MAKE THE MUCH NEEDED EMPLOYEE FREE 
CHOICE ACT POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE1 
 
By Charles B. Craver2 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 American labor law has reached a critical point. Private sector union membership 
has declined from 35 percent in 19543 to 7.6 percent today.4 The National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA),5 which was enacted in 1935 to protect the rights of employees to 
form, join, and assist labor organizations and to select exclusive bargaining agents to 
negotiate their basic terms of employment, has become an outdated and anemic statute. 
When the NLRA was passed, the U.S. was a mass production economy dominated by 
relatively large corporate employers most of whose employees desired union 
representation. The existing American Federation of Labor (AFL), which consisted 
primarily of trade unions representing skilled craft workers, did not know how its union 
affiliates could effectively organize industrial bargaining units consisting  of skilled, 
semi-skilled, and unskilled workers. It formed the Committee for Industrial Organization 
to develop a strategic plan. AFL leaders hoped to organize employees in the automobile, 
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2  Freda H. Alverson Professor, George Washington University Law School. J.D., 1971, 
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steel, rubber, and electrical manufacturing industries and divide those individuals among 
different trade unions. When it became clear to union leaders on the Committee for 
Industrial Organization that such a system would not work well for industrial workers, 
they withdrew from the AFL and formed the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). 
 CIO leaders quickly established the United Automobile Workers Union, the 
Steelworkers Union, the Rubber Workers Union, and the Electrical Workers Union, and 
these new entities began to organize the manufacturing facilities in their respective 
industries. Although many employers initially opposed union organization, both the new 
Labor Board and strong union efforts overcame employer opposition. The vast majority 
of industrial workers desired a collective voice, and they selected industrial unions to 
represent them. From the enactment of the NLRA in 1935 until the Taft-Hartley Act 
amendments in 1947, labor organizations could obtain Labor Board certification through 
either secret ballot elections or “any other suitable method” to determine if a majority or 
workers in an appropriate bargaining unit desired a collective voice. In many cases, once 
it became clear that a majority of employees in particular bargaining units had signed 
authorization cards designating specific unions as their bargaining agents, employers 
voluntarily extended recognition to those labor organizations without the need to utilize 
the Labor Board election process. 
 During the 1940s and 1950s, competition between AFL and CIO affiliates was 
significant, and private sector union membership grew from 15 percent in 1935 to 35 
percent in 1955.6 At that time, AFL and CIO unions decided to reunite in the AFL-CIO.7  
                                               
6  See PAUL WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR 
AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 8-9 (1990). 
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Despite recent predictions by some persons opposed to changes in the current labor laws 
suggesting that increased union membership would greatly increase unemployment, the 
U.S. did not experience such a problem when unions represented over one-third of the 
labor force. What we did see during that period was a willingness of employers to share 
firm success with workers in the form of generous wages and fringe benefits, creating a 
sizable blue-collar middle class. Nonetheless, corporate leaders were becoming 
concerned about diminishing profits caused by increased labor costs generated through 
the collective bargaining process.8 As a result, a growing number of unorganized firms 
decided to work harder to prevent the unionization of their employees. 
 American business leaders also engaged in political activity to limit the rights and 
economic power possessed by labor organizations and their supporters. In 1947, they 
induced Congress to enact the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)9 amendments 
to the NLRA. These statutory changes prohibited a number of unfair labor practices by 
labor organizations, and restricted the capacity of unions to employ secondary activity to 
enhance their bargaining power vis-à-vis primary employers. The LMRA amendments 
ended the right of the Labor Board to certify bargaining agents except through secret 
ballot elections, and eliminated the ability of labor organizations to control the supply of 
labor through closed shop agreements that required employers to hire only persons 
                                                                                                                                            
7 See, Charles B. Craver, The Labor Movement Needs a Twenty-First Century Committee 
for Industrial Organization, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMPL. L.J. 69 (2005). 
 
8  See Craig A. Olson & Brian E. Becker, The Effects of the NLRA on Stockholder Wealth 
in the 1930s, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 116, 123 (1990) (indicating that business 
experts estimated that the enactment of the NLRA and the resulting unionization of 
millions of workers caused a 15.9 percent decline in shareholder wealth). 
 
9 Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Act. 
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already members of unions.10 Under the LMRA amendments, new employees could only 
be required to become union “members” after the thirtieth day of their employment,11 and 
such individuals were only obliged to become “financial core” members – they had to 
tender the initiation fee and monthly dues, but did not have to become actual union 
members.12  
 Business groups induced Congress to further narrow worker and union rights in 
the 1959 Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA)13 amendments to 
the NLRA. These statutory changes expanded the scope of proscribed secondary activity 
and outlawed many forms of organizational and recognitional picketing.14 The LMRDA 
also regulated internal union affairs, required the filing of annual financial reports with 
the Department of Labor, and imposed fiduciary obligations on union officials. 
 Corporate opposition to unions grew more expeditiously during the inflationary 
years of the 1970s, as cost-of-living adjustment provisions in bargaining agreements 
required employers to raise wages in proportion to increases in the consumer price index. 
Many firms demanded concession bargaining that forced labor organizations to accept 
wage and benefit reductions, while others transferred production to lower wage areas 
                                               
10 See THEODORE J. ST. ANTOINE,CHARLES B. CRAVER & MARION G. CRAIN, 
LABOR RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 112 (11th ed. 2005). 
 
11 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2000). 
 
12 See Union Starch & Ref. Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 779 (1949), enforced, 186 F.3d 1008 (7th 
Cir. 1951). 
 
13 Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959). 
 
14 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 8(b)(4) & (b)(7) (2000). 
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within the U.S. and abroad. Even organized employers began to explore ways to induce 
their employees to decertify incumbent bargaining representatives. 
 Although the absolute number of union members increased from 17,000,000 in 
the mid-1950s to 22,000,000 in 1980, the percentage of non agricultural labor force 
participants in unions declined from 35 to 23 percent due to the fact that union 
membership growth did not keep pace with more rapidly expanding labor force growth.15 
During the 1980s and 1990s, union membership declined both in absolute terms and as a 
percentage of the nonagricultural labor force. Today, there are only 16.1 million union 
members, comprising 12.4 percent of labor force participants.16 This figure actually 
masks the continuing decline in private sector union membership, because it includes the 
36.8 percent of public sector employees who are union members. When only private 
sector workers are included, the proportion of workers in unions declines to a mere 7.6 
percent. 
 Various factors have contributed to the significant decline in private sector union 
membership.17 Many manufacturing employees have been displaced by automation and 
the transfer of production jobs to low wage countries like China. The transformation of 
the American economy from blue-collar manufacturing jobs to white-collar and service 
jobs has also eroded areas of traditional union strength. These factors have depleted the 
                                               
15  See GOLDFIELD, supra note 3, at 10-11 tbls. 1 & 2. 
 
16 See Rose, supra note 4, at AA-1. 
 
17  See HOYT N. WHEELER, THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN LABOR 
MOVEMENT 12-13 (2002); CHARLES B. CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SURVIVE? 34-
55 (1993). 
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ranks of major industrial unions like the Auto Workers, the Steelworkers, the Electrical 
Workers, and the Chemical Workers. 
 Does the decline in union membership over the past several decades indicate that 
employees no longer wish to be represented by labor organizations? The answer is “no.” 
A recent study by Professors Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers found that 87 percent of 
workers would still like to have some form of collective influence with respect to firm 
decisions that affect their employment terms and job security.18 They appreciate the fact 
that as at-will employees who can be terminated by their employers at any time for 
almost any reason that does not contravene established civil rights laws or significant 
public policies they possess no meaningful bargaining power vis-à-vis their corporate 
employers. They merely possess the “exit voice” – i.e., they can leave their present 
employers if they are dissatisfied with their working conditions. Employees recognize the 
need for a collective voice to influence their employment situations, since changing their 
employment positions is not an easy task. 
 If the vast majority of private sector employees would like a collective voice, why 
have they failed to select bargaining agents to further their interests? They fear employer 
retaliation if they take such action. Corporate employers are vehemently opposed to 
unionization. They often retain the services of labor relations consultants or aggressive 
law firms to oppose union organizing campaigns. Employers may post anti-union 
messages on firm bulletin boards, send anti-union messages to employees via company e-
mail systems, include anti-union statements in employee pay envelopes, and express their 
                                               
18 See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WOREKRS WANT 147 
(1999). 
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anti union sentiments at “captive audience” speeches which employees may be required 
to attend. Employers may apply additional pressure by having supervisors talk with small 
groups of workers about the negative effects of unionization. Although employers may 
not threaten workers about the possible adverse effects of unionization, they may make 
“predictions” regarding the likely negative consequences of union selection.19 
 Union organizers do not have the same channels of communication open to them. 
They do not have access to company bulletin boards, e-mail systems, and pay envelopes. 
They are generally not permitted to respond to employer captive audience presentations. 
They can only gain access to firm premises if there are no external communication 
channels available to them.20 While supervisors can disseminate their anti-union 
messages during actual work time, pro-union employees can only spread their messages 
when they and other workers are on break.21  
 Unscrupulous employers often terminate visible union supporters during 
organizing campaigns.22 Such overt anti-union conduct generally sends a chilling 
message to other employees who are contemplating support for organizing unions. The 
individuals who have been unlawfully discharged are unlikely to be ordered reinstated for 
a year or two. By then, their remaining colleagues have often voted against unionization, 
fearing that their selection of bargaining agents would seriously jeopardize their 
                                               
19 See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 577-78 (1969). 
 
20 See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992). 
 
21 See NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357 (1958). 
 
22 See WEILER, supra note 6, at 238-39; Robert J. LaLonde & Bernard D. Meltzer, Hard 
Times for Unions: Another Look at the Significance of Employer Illegalities, 58 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 953, 961-69 (1991). 
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continued employment security. The only monetary remedy for such illegal terminations 
involves back pay awards, and the fired persons have a duty to mitigate their losses 
during the litigation process before the Labor Board, reducing the final cost to their 
employers. 
 Even when labor organizations are able to counteract employer anti-union efforts 
and gain Labor Board certification, they are not guaranteed bargaining success. The 
employers involved are only obliged to meet with such unions at reasonable times and 
seriously discuss the wages, hours, and employment conditions of the relevant 
employees. They are not required to make concessions or to reach agreements.23 As long 
as they appear to be bargaining in good faith, they can extend the negotiation process 
indefinitely without tangible results. Even if unions file unfair labor practice charges 
challenging the good faith nature of their actions, it can take one or two years for final 
decisions to be issued, and the most they have to fear are cease and desist orders directing 
them to return to the bargaining table in good faith. There are no monetary remedies 
imposed upon employers who engage in bad faith bargaining.24 In over forty percent of 
cases newly certified unions are unable to achieve first contracts.25 Once it appears to the 
employees who selected representative unions that those entities are impotent, 
decertification petitions are often filed and the responsible unions are defeated. 
                                               
23 See 29 U.S.C. § 8(d) (2000) (defining the duty to bargain under the NLRA). 
 
24 See Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970). 
 
25 See John-Paul Ferguson & Thomas A. Kochan, Sequential Failures in Workers’ Right 
to Organize 1 (March 2006) (unpublished manuscript), cited in William B. Gould IV, The 
Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, Labor Law Reform, and What Can Be Done About 
the Broken System of Labor-Management Relations Law in the United States, 43 U.S.F. 
L. REV. 291, 325 (2008). 
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 Labor supporters in Congress have proposed the Employee Free Choice Act 
(EFCA) to level the playing field and provide workers with the opportunity to select 
union representation without significant interference from anti-union employers.26 The 
three principal sections of this statute would: (1) authorize the Labor Board to certify 
unions as bargaining agents once a majority of employees have signed authorization 
cards; (2) permit the Labor Board to award treble damage awards when employees are 
unlawfully terminated during union organizing campaigns; and (3) require mediation and 
then binding arbitration of first contracts when the negotiating parties are unable to 
achieve agreements on their own.  
 Business leaders are vehemently opposed to the card-check certification provision 
and the first contract arbitration mandate, and they are working diligently to prevent the 
enactment of the EFCA in its current form. If labor union officials and Democratic 
supporters of the EFCA refuse to consider possible modifications that might enable them 
to obtain a cloture vote in the Senate, it is doubtful an actual vote on the merits will 
result. This article will explore the different provisions of the EFCA and will propose 
modifications that might make that proposed law more palatable to employers.  
II. CARD CHECK CERTIFICATION 
        Many opponents of the EFCA card check certification provisions assert that true 
industrial democracy can only be preserved by way of traditional secret ballot elections. 
They equate Labor Board representation elections with general political elections, failing 
                                               
26 See Catherine Hollingsworty, House Panel Approves Union Organizing Bill Covering 
Certification by Authorization Cards, BNA/DAILY LAB. REP. No. 32, Feb. 16, 2007, at 
AA-1; Karen L. Werner, House Passes Card-Check Organizing Bill, Setting Stage for 
Showdown in Senate, BNA/DAILY LAB. REP. No. 41, March 2, 2007, at AA-1. 
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to acknowledge the undue influence possessed by employers compared to federal, state, 
and local politicians. When individuals vote in political elections, they do not fear that the 
outcomes of those elections may directly threaten their future job security. On the other 
hand, many employers opposing union organizing campaigns expressly or implicitly 
suggest to their employees prior to Labor Board elections that if unions are selected as 
bargaining agents, those workers may lose their jobs due to increased labor costs. It 
should thus be clear that Labor Board elections are not free from such external influence. 
 When I speak to EFCA opponents who extol the virtue of secret ballot elections, 
they become quite upset when I suggest that the salaries and bonuses paid to corporate 
executives should be subject to secret ballot elections by shareholders. While they 
maintain that secret ballot elections should be required for employees considering the 
selection of bargaining agents, they do not believe that shareholders should possess the 
right to vote in secret ballot elections on issues of corporate significance. These persons 
seem to think that unions have never been allowed to obtain Labor Board certification 
except through secret ballot elections. They fail to appreciate the fact that the original 
NLRA authorized the certification of labor organizations based upon signed authorization 
cards from 1935 until 1947 without significant difficulties. 
 Supporters of the EFCA maintain that the Labor Board election process is tainted 
by employer economic power used to intimidate employees who support union 
campaigns. They assert that reliance upon authorization cards would provide a fairer way 
to determine if a majority of workers truly desire union representation. EFCA opponents, 
however, suggest that some individuals may be induced to sign union authorization cards 
through overt coercion or more subtle forms of social pressure. Overt coercion is clearly 
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unlawful and would contravene Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA,27 which prohibits 
actions by labor organizations that would interfere with the statutorily protected rights of 
employees. As a result, such behavior rarely occurs. Although it is true that some workers 
may feel social pressure to sign authorization cards if many of their coworkers support 
union organizing drives, such social pressure is unlikely to be as significant as the fear of 
job losses union supporters might have if unions win Labor Board elections. Due to their 
economic dependence on continued employment, employees tend to be far more 
influenced by coercive employer tactics than by improper union actions. 
 Employer groups have challenged the EFCA based upon the claim that unions 
would be able to obtain authorization card signatures from employees before targeted 
employers could explain the negative aspects of union representation. Some EFCA 
supporters have suggested that employers have no right to disseminate their views of 
unions during organizing campaigns, but such assertions ignore two critical 
considerations. First, corporate employers enjoy First Amendment free speech rights,28 
and have the right to express their anti-union opinions. Second, employees have the right 
to appreciate both the pros and cons of unionization. Labor organizers do an excellent job 
of communicating the benefits they think workers can derive from collective 
representation. Individual employees opposed to unionization lack any formal platform to 
                                               
27 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (2000). 
 
28 See NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941) (indicating that 
employer statements about unions should not be regarded as evidence of unlawful 
behavior unless, viewed against the “totality of conduct,” they are coercive. This concept 
was added to the NLRA in 1947 by way of Section 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2000), 
which protects the free speech rights of both labor organizations and employers, so long 
as statements do not contain a threat of reprisal or promise of benefit. 
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express their sentiments. If such viewpoints are to be disseminated in an effective 
manner, targeted employers must be given the opportunity to communicate their opinions 
to employees being organized. 
 Employer groups have challenged the EFCA based upon the claim that unions 
would be able to obtain authorization card signatures from employees before targeted 
employers could explain the negative aspects of union representation. Most employers 
learn fairly early about incipient union campaigns from their own employees who 
mention such drives to supervisory personnel. Nonetheless, labor organizations would 
still have several days to obtain signatures before employers could gear up their anti-
union campaigns and express their sentiments to their employees. To offset this factor, 
Congress could include a provision in the EFCA that would require labor organizations 
seeking to obtain bargaining rights through authorization cards to notify targeted 
employers – and the appropriate regional offices of the Labor Board – of their planned 
campaigns. The statute could provide that only authorization cards signed after 
employers have received such notice would be considered when determining whether to 
extend bargaining rights to the unions involved. To avoid the improper forward-dating of 
cards actually signed by persons prior to such employer notification, labor organizations 
could be required to obtain Labor Board imprints in the cards they plan to use when they 
initially notify the Labor Board office of anticipated organizing campaigns. 
 In exchange for the right to be notified of incipient union organizing campaigns, 
Congress might consider the recent proposal by Representative Joe Sestak (D. Pa.) that 
would require employers to provide unions with the same means of communication being 
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used by employers opposing union campaigns.29 This approach would allow employees 
to hear the pros and cons of unionization from both sides, on a relatively equal basis. If 
employers decide to give captive audience speeches, union supporters would have the 
right to respond at such sessions. If employers communicate anti-union messages on 
bulletin boards, e-mail sites, or in documents included in worker pay envelopes, union 
organizers would have the right to use those same communication channels. If employers 
have supervisory personnel communicate anti-union sentiments during work hours, union 
supporters should enjoy the same privilege. It should be difficult for persons who believe 
in true industrial democracy to argue that employers should be able to use such means of 
communication without extending similar privileges to union supporters. 
 Individuals opposed to card check certifications maintain that since some 
authorization card signers may have been induced to sign such cards due to overt 
coercion or more subtle social pressure, bargaining rights may be extended to labor 
organizations that do not actually possess majority employee support. How might this 
concern be ameliorated? Congress could modify the current EFCA bill to require a 
weighted majority before bargaining rights could be extended by the Labor Board 
pursuant to authorization card showings. Unions could be required to sign up 60 or 67 
percent of individuals in particular bargaining units before certification could be 
approved. Such an approach would greatly diminish the likelihood that bargaining rights 
would be extended to unions that did not actually possess majority worker support. 
                                               
29 See Ryan Davis, Bill to Ease Union Organizing Reintroduced, 
http://employment.law360.com/articles/91030 (March 12, 2009). 
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 Members of Congress who still believe that only secret ballot elections should be 
used to grant certification to labor organizations should consider two alternatives. First, 
statutory provisions could impose monetary fines on employers who threaten union 
supporters during representation campaigns. At the present time, the only remedy for 
such conduct consists of cease and desist orders directing offending employers to refrain 
from such behavior in the future. Meaningful fines would have an appropriate deterrent 
effect. Second, a provision requiring the Labor Board to conduct representation elections 
within five or ten days after election petitions are filed would be beneficial. This is the 
practice followed by labor laws in several Canadian provinces.30 Such an approach would 
significantly shorten the fifty to sixty days most employers currently have to engage in 
anti-union campaigning prior to Labor Board elections.31 Both employers and labor 
organizations would have sufficient time to disseminate their pro or anti union messages, 
and such expedited elections would decrease the ability of employers to coerce potential 
voters through express or implicit job loss statements. 
 Senators Arlen Specter and Mark Pryor have been contemplating an alternative 
approach that might satisfy the concerns of both sides. They would authorize the Labor 
Board to conduct certification elections by way of mail-in ballots. To satisfy union 
demands for a more expeditious certification determination process, the Labor Board 
could be required to send out the mail-in ballots immediately after labor organizations 
have petitioned for certification. This could provide election results within ten days after 
petitions have been filed. It would also assuage employer concerns regarding employee 
                                               
30 See Gould, supra note 25, at 317. 
 
31 See id. at 315. 
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free choice, by allowing employees to decide whether to vote for or against union 
representation in the secrecy of their own homes. 
III. TREBLE DAMAGE AWARDS FOR UNLAWFULLY TERMINATED UNION 
 SUPPORTERS  
 The most potent weapon available to anti-union employers involves the overt 
discharge of open union supporters. Such conduct has an immediate chilling effect, and it 
discourages other employees from engaging in public acts supporting organizing 
campaigns. At the present time, illegally terminated workers have only two Labor Board 
remedies. After one or two years of unfair labor practice litigation before administrative 
law judges, the Labor Board, and courts of appeals, such persons are awarded back pay 
covering their periods of unemployment and the responsible employers are directed to 
offer them reinstatement to their former positions. By this time, the fired individuals have 
suffered both emotional and economic losses, and their former colleagues have been 
greatly intimidated.  
 A provision in the proposed EFCA would authorize the Labor Board to award 
treble damages to union supporters unlawfully discharged during union organizing 
drives. Such a remedy would have two benefits. The additional money involved would 
help to compensate the adversely affected persons for their lost earnings and the 
emotional distress they have sustained, and it would have a greater deterrent impact on 
employers considering such actions than the mere awarding of back pay. 
 What else could Congress do to ameliorate the significant impact of unlawful 
terminations of union supporters – and eliminate or at least ameliorate the need for 
increased monetary penalties in such situations? It could amend the NLRA to require the 
Labor Board to petition district courts for temporary restraining orders directing the 
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immediate reinstatement of individuals the Board believes have been clearly discharged 
because of their protected actions supporting union organizing campaigns. They are thus 
returned to their work environments while the unfair labor practice proceedings unfold. 
At the present time, the Labor Board is obliged to seek such mandatory injunctive relief 
under Section 10(l)32 when labor organizations engage in secondary activity in violation 
of Section 8(b)(4)33 or organizational or recognitional picketing in violation of Section 
8(b)(7).34  On the other hand, when employers commit unfair labor practices, the Labor 
Board may seek preliminary injunctions under Section 10(j)35 to maintain the status quo 
while the actual unfair labor practice charges are being litigated. The Board uses its 10(j) 
injunctive remedy sparingly. This is why it takes so long for discriminatees to obtain 
reinstatement orders. If Congress were to add Section 8(a)(3) discharges to Section 10(l),  
unlawfully terminated union supporters would gain expeditious reinstatement. This 
would be highly beneficial for those individuals, and it would minimize the continuing 
negative impact of their public terminations on their coworkers. 
IV. FIRST CONTRACT ARBITRATION 
 The most controversial provisions in the EFCA are those pertaining to labor 
organizations that have been certified by way of card checks or secret ballot elections but 
that have been unable to obtain initial contracts through the collective bargaining process. 
If no agreement is reached within ninety days, under the EFCA the Federal Mediation 
                                               
32 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (2000). 
 
33 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (2000). 
 
34 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (2000). 
 
35 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (2000). 
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and Conciliation Service is to provide neutral facilitation services. If after thirty days of 
mediation no agreement is obtained, the matter is to be resolved through binding interest 
arbitration. The employer and the labor organization would present their economic data 
and relevant arguments to either a single arbitrator or a three member arbitration panel 
that would be empowered to determine the initial wages, hours, fringe benefits, and 
working conditions to govern the parties’ initial year. 
 One preliminary matter should be considered that could reduce the number of 
cases that might be sent to arbitration. When unions are now certified by way of secret 
ballot Labor Board elections, the affected employers often refuse to acknowledge the 
validity of the Board certification orders. They refuse to bargain with the newly certified 
labor organizations, forcing those entities to seek relief through Section 8(a)(5)36 refusal 
to bargain charges. It can take a year or two for these cases to be resolved through 
administrative law judge, Labor Board, and Court of Appeal proceedings. By that time, 
employees who supported unionization have become cynical regarding the efficacy of 
NLRA protections, and the representative unions have begun to view the dilatory 
employers quite negatively. As a result, when the parties finally sit down to bargain, the 
setting is quite contentious. The likelihood they will successfully negotiate first contracts 
is slight. 
 What might Congress do to minimize the impact of such frequently unmeritorious 
delays? It could amend Section 10(l) to require the Labor Board to seek temporary 
restraining orders directing employers to recognize and bargain with newly certified labor 
organizations while the Section 8(a)(5) charges are being litigated, whenever the Board 
                                               
36 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2000). 
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has preliminarily determined that the employers are engaged in clearly unjustified 
refusals to honor the union certifications. If employers were required to bargain with 
unions immediately following their Labor Board certifications, the likelihood that 
contracts could be obtained through the collective bargaining process would increase. 
This would obviate the need for first contract arbitration. 
 If the first contract arbitration provision is retained in the EFCA, economically 
weak labor organizations may decide that they have nothing to lose by invoking such 
procedures. Since it would be difficult to imagine arbitrators awarding unions benefits 
less beneficial than those being offered by employers at the bargaining table, union 
leaders could reasonably believe that arbitral procedures would have to generate benefits 
above those offered by the employers. As a result, the availability of interest arbitration 
would diminish the probability that unions would bargain in complete good faith 
following their initial certifications. 
 If first contract arbitration is to be employed to resolve bargaining failures after 
120 days, what standards should be imposed on the final arbiters? Should they be 
authorized to dictate any initial terms they think appropriate or should their discretion be 
circumscribed? It is difficult for me to imagine external arbitrators determining the 
specific wages, fringe benefits, hours, and working conditions to cover newly unionized 
employees. Should they adopt standards consistent with other similar firms in the U.S. or 
the immediate geographical area or should they consider the practices of local firms in 
diverse lines of work? What health care and pension coverage should be imposed? What 
forms of union security should they mandate? What management rights clauses should be 
included? If Congress decides to include a first contract arbitration provision in the 
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EFCA, it should include something to constrain arbitrator discretion. It should require 
arbitrators to choose between the final offers tendered by the employers and labor 
organizations based upon the reasonableness of the relevant terms. This could be done on 
a total contract basis or on an issue-by-issue basis. I would suggest the issue-by-issue 
approach to enable arbitrators to select – issue-by-issue – the more reasonable of the 
proposals advanced by labor and management. This approach would encourage 
bargaining parties to make reasonable proposals to each other, which might obviate the 
need for arbitration. When mutual accords could not be achieved, this procedure would 
limit the economic discretion possessed by arbitrators. 
 For members of Congress who find binding interest arbitration too extreme a 
dispute resolution mechanism, they might consider non-binding arbitration where 
arbitrators would conduct hearings, determine the relevant facts, and make non-binding, 
but public, recommendations to the parties. The labor and management representatives 
would then return to the bargaining table. The public arbitral findings and suggestions 
would put pressure on the negotiating parties to seek agreements in line with the arbitral 
recommendations.  
V. CONCLUSION 
 The NLRA no longer protects the rights of employees who desire union 
representation. Despite the fact the vast majority of workers would like some form of 
collective voice to counterbalance the economic power possessed by their corporate 
employers, most have been unable to achieve such representation. Employers have a 
substantial advantage over organizing unions due to both their economic power and the 
fact they have unlimited means to communicate their anti-union messages to employees. 
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Business success is attributable to three critical groups: (1) the shareholders who provide 
the investment capital; (2) the managers who direct the business; and (3) the employees 
who produce the goods or services. Over the past several decades, rank-and-file workers 
have become the junior partners in firm success, but the junior partners in firm failure.37  
 Congress should seriously consider some form of EFCA that would level the 
playing field and guarantee employees the right to select bargaining representatives if 
they wish to have a collective voice.  
 The use of authorization cards to obtain union certification would make it easier 
for labor unions to organize employees. To minimize the impact of union coercion or 
social pressure, unions could be required to sign up 60 or 67 percent of unit personnel 
before they could be certified. To guarantee union supporters an equal opportunity to 
spread their pro-union message, employers could be required to provide union supporters 
with the same means of communication they employ to spread their anti-union messages. 
If Congress continues to believe in the sanctity of secret ballot elections, they could 
amend the NLRA to require the Labor Board to conduct representation elections within 
five or ten days after election petitions are filed. This might even be accomplished by 
directing the Labor Board to use mail-in ballots that could be sent to eligible employees 
shortly after certification petitions have been filed. 
 To limit the tendency of employers to unlawfully terminate open union supporters 
during organizing campaigns, Congress could authorize treble back pay awards to 
persons fired in this manner. They could alternatively amend Section 10(l) to require the 
                                               
37 See Charles B. Craver, The American Worker: Junior Partner in Success and Senior 
Partner in Failure, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 587 (2003). 
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Labor Board to seek preliminary injunctive relief reinstating individuals who appear to 
have been discharged illegally while their unfair labor practice proceedings unfold. 
Congress could similarly amend Section 10(l) to require the Labor Board to seek such 
preliminary injunctive relief in cases where unions have obtained certification but the 
employers have refused to honor those certifications. Such firms would be directed to 
recognize and bargain with the newly certified labor organizations while the underlying 
refusal to bargain charges are being litigated. 
 The most controversial part of the EFCA involves the provisions that would 
mandate first contract arbitration after 120 days of unsuccessful bargaining. This would 
constitute a significant change in existing American labor law and it would ignore the 
fact that newly certified unions often fail to obtain first contracts. To limit arbitral 
discretion if these procedures are adopted, Congress should direct arbiters to select 
between the final offers of labor and management on an issue-by-issue basis. They could 
alternatively require only non-binding arbitration in which the arbitrators would decide 
the underlying factual and economic issues and make public recommendations the parties 
would not be obliged to accept, but would have to consider when they returned to the 
bargaining table. 
 
